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D. M. King and M. N. Tamburri
“Rational Noncompliance and the Liquidation of New England Groundfish Resources,”
Marine
Policy
34 (2010): 7–21.
17. Standards for Living Organisms in Ships’ Ballast Water Discharged in U.S. Waters, Proposed
Rule and Notice, supra note 6.
18. Phase Two of the U.S. standards involves discharge standards 1,000 times stricter than Phase
One, and also includes other restrictions such as limits on the ballast water discharge of virus and
virus-like particles. However, Phase Two will come into force only after a “practicability review” of
the availability of both methods to measure the stricter standards and ballast water treatments to meet
the stricter standards. Based on this phased approach, ship operators will not be expected to comply
with standards that cannot be measured or achieved using available technology. However, unresolved
questions remain regarding how regulators will provide the necessary incentives for ship operators
to comply with standards that are achievable and how regulators will verify when ships are meeting
those standards.
19. Economic factors affecting compliance are associated with the potential illegal gain and the
cost of getting caught. See G. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,”
Journal of
Political Economy
76 (1968): 169–217. Normative factors affecting compliance are associated with
an individual’s moral obligation to comply, which stem from an individual’s standard of personal
morality and perceptions about whether rules and regulations are just and moral and are being applied
fairly and equitably. See T. Tyler,
Why People Obey the Law
(New Haven: Yale University Press,
1990). Models of enforcement or compliance that incorporate both economic and normative factors
are based on what has become known as the “enriched theory of compliance.” See the following for
a detailed discussion of this theory and related models: K. Kuperan and J. G. Sutinen, “Blue Water
Crime: Legitimacy, Deterrence and Compliance in Fisheries,”
Law and Society Review
32 (1998):
309–338; and J. G. Sutinen and K. Kuperan, “A Socioeconomic Theory of Regulatory Compliance
in Fisheries,”
International Journal of Social Economics
26 (1999): 174–193.
20. The original economic model of enforcement and compliance by Becker, supra note
19, became the basis for a series of subsequent studies on the economics of crime. See J. M.
Heineke (ed.),
Economic Models of Criminal Behavior
(New York: North-Holland, 1978); and D.
J. Pyle,
The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). It
is generally understood that economic factors, not normative factors, determine rates of corporate
crime.
21. The results of a recent study of the costs of installing and operating certified ballast water
treatment systems (BWTSs) indicated that the cost of purchasing and installing a certified BWTS is
in the range of
$
600,000 to
$
1.2 million, and annual operating and maintenance costs are in the range
of
$
15,000 to
$
125,000. Cost ranges reflect differences in ship type and size as well as differences in
BWT systems. D. King, P. Hagan, and M. Riggio, “The Emerging Market for Ballast Water Treatment
Technologies,” 2009 unpublished draft.
22. This implies that enforcement strategies that rely on inspections of BWTS rather than direct
or indirect measures of the effectiveness of BWTS may provide “perverse incentives” for limiting
the use of BWTS that may result in more violations of ballast water discharge standards at the same
time that fewer violations are detected.
23. This approach to estimating the deterrence effect of enforcement was introduced by Becker,
supra note 19. A recent application of the approach that involved developing estimates of all parameters
is described in King and Sutinen, supra note 15.
24. The parameter (
e
) in Equation 1 is included because experience with other at-sea enforce-
ment systems (e.g., in commercial fisheries) indicates that violators who are prosecuted often negotiate
a “settlement penalty amount” that involves them paying less than the official “scheduled penalty
amount.”
25. Cost-effectiveness analysis, which is sometimes referred to as incremental cost analysis,
is normally used to compare alternatives when the difficulty of measuring benefits prevents the use
of conventional cost-benefit analysis. See United States Army Corps of Engineers, “Evaluation of
Environmental Investments Procedures Manual—Interim: Cost Effectiveness and Incremental Cost
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